8 Reasons Why Putin Won't Use a Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine

Why nuclear strategy and deterrence will hold even as the war turns against Russia

Nuclear weapons have a strong connection to Clausewitz, in that they’re a very clear illustration of the unity between war and policy. As a result, even the smallest warheads, so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons, have enormous political significance. Given the tenor of discussions around Russian nukes, I thought it was a good idea to make a list of the compelling reasons that Putin has to not use a nuclear weapon. 

1. Do these things even work?

Leaving aside the literal functionality of Russia’s aged weapons, are tactical nukes even effective? They’ve never been used, so no one can be sure. Tactical nuclear weapons were developed during the Cold War for warfare involving densely massed units along the inter-German border where a single warhead might destroy hundreds of armored-fighting-vehicles and halt a decisive tank thrust. The war in Ukraine is a far cry from the clash between superpowers tactical nukes were designed for.

The frontline in Ukraine is vast, with formations dispersed across miles of open countryside. In such conditions, to significantly affect the military balance would require the employment of large numbers of nuclear weapons to saturate the front, something there are no indications of the Russians considering.

 Russian nuclear escalation would involve either one or a small number of tactical nuclear weapons used primarily as a political signal. However, because of the low density of forces in Ukraine, there’s little to indicate that tactical nuclear weapons would have significant impact on the battlefield, and therefore have the desired political impact. 

When taken with the inherent risks and costs of nuclear use, uncertainty regarding its benefits makes it highly unappealing. Using a nuclear weapon is incredibly risky. That risk can only be justified by a proportional reward. Tactical nukes can’t promise to radically shift the battlefield situation in Russia’s favor and, as a result, can’t justify the risk in using them. 

2. What makes Russia so special?

There’s no shortage of nuclear powers that lost wars, often in a humiliating fashion, to non-nuclear states. When the Taliban advanced on Kabul, there was no sudden frenzy of speculation that Joe Biden might use tactical nuclear weapons if faced with defeat. When the Americans and the Chinese each failed in Vietnam, nuclear weapons were never seriously considered. What, then, is so special about Russia that the potential for defeat has created a tizzy of media speculation that nuclear use is imminent? The answer, it seems, is that many people have convinced themselves that Russia and its leadership are somehow exempt from the basic logic of self-preservation. 

These fundamentals are essential to avoiding dismissing Russian behavior as inscrutable. The prospect of being vaporized in a nuclear war is equally terrifying to Russian decision-makers as to anyone else. 

3. Who will co-sign a nuclear strike?

While Putin possesses sole nuclear authority in theory, actually using a nuclear weapon requires at least the tacit support of an unknown number of individuals in the Russian government and military. Opposing Putin is a scary prospect, without a doubt-he has gone to great lengths to make sure that is the case. However, if anything would spur desperate opposition, it would be the prospect of nuclear annihilation. Putin’s primary goal is staying in power. Nuclear use is unlikely on the basis that he’s not going to do something that gives a lot of people a good reason to think their survival might rely on getting rid of him.

Putin certainly appears secure in his position, with no opposition that could credibly oppose or remove him at present. However, nuclear use is so exceptionally dangerous that Putin cannot be sure of his security. The fear of nuclear armageddon could drive internal instability. Both those in Russia actively seeking power and those who would otherwise have remained loyal to Putin, may decide that the risks of carrying out a coup are lesser than braving the consequences of nuclear use. Putin therefore has good reasons to consider nuclear use something that weakens, rather than strengthens, his domestic position and creates a window in which fear threatens his regime rather than protects it. 

4. Would the West allow Putin to use a nuke?

Putin has good reasons to be skeptical that he’d be able to use a tactical nuke unopposed. Not only does he have internal enemies to fear, but he has no shortage of foreign powers that wish him harm and desperately wish for nuclear weapons not to be used. The extent of American signals intelligence and human intelligence capabilities in Russia is unknown both to the observing public and to Russian decisionmakers. However, at minimum, the publicly available information about the extent of the intelligence provided to the Ukrainians demonstrates that American capabilities are substantial. Russia has a security problem, which is a poor counterpart to attempting to use nuclear weapons. 

Therefore, if Russia decides to use a nuclear weapon both Ukraine, and the West as a whole, will know about it and have the opportunity to interfere. And, of course, there are powerful incentives to do so. The United States might well choose to destroy whatever means the Russians intend to deliver a nuclear weapon before it can be utilized in order to send a clear message. Ukraine has struck nuclear capable platforms deep in Russia before . 

Therefore, Putin must weigh whatever benefits he hopes to reap from nuclear use against the dangers of being preempted. This concern should not be understated. In addition to international consequences of having attempted to use a nuclear weapon, Putin would face the prestige consequences of having failed to do so as well as the direct problem of the fate of the warhead if its delivery system was destroyed. A realistic worst-case scenario would see Putin facing a domestic crisis from Russian nationalists at the humiliation of failed nuclear use and a nuclear weapon lost somewhere on Russian soil. 

5. Would the West let Putin get away with using a nuke?

Even if Putin believes he would be able to use a nuclear weapon without interference, NATO has been clear what its response to Russian nuclear use would be: an airpower campaign to destroy Russian assets beyond its borders to cause a collapse of the Russian army. Beyond the question as to whether Russia can effectively deploy a nuclear weapon, Putin must ask the basic strategic question: will nuclear use improve Russia’s situation? If it provokes NATO intervention and leads to the destruction of the Russian army, the answer to that question is an emphatic “no”. 

Without a strong Russian army backing Putin’s hold on power, internal opportunists will be both emboldened and have an unprecedented opportunity to move against him. Using a nuke would mean risking NATO destroying the security of Putin’s rule. From Putin’s perspective, given the deeply uncertain benefits of nuclear use, risking greater NATO involvement is a poor tradeoff. Russian strategy towards Ukraine aims to convince the West to disengage, which using a nuclear weapon runs counter to. Using a nuclear weapon would draw the West deeper into the Ukraine conflict and silence the most useful voices for Russian interests in Western politics. There’s a lot for Putin to fear even if the use of nuclear weapons achieves all he could hope on the battlefield. 

6. Escalating to de-escalate is just escalation

 The concept of “escalating to de-escalate” is reliant on the political significance of nuclear use, hoping that using a nuclear warhead presents a dichotomy between a negotiated settlement and nuclear war. It’s a very Clausewitzian idea, where the immense fear that surrounds nuclear weapons is utilized to try to end hostilities. This is one theory for how Putin might respond to conventional retaliation by NATO, particularly if the Russian army is collapsing.

 From Putin’s perspective, however, escalation doesn’t seem particularly promising. His primary adversary, the United States, with its significant intelligence capabilities and long history of counterforce preparations, might carry out a preemptive strike if it believes Russia plans to escalate. The US, using airpower, cyber, and electronic warfare could decapitate Russian leadership, destroy the chain of command and launch a nuclear strike against Russian nuclear assets. Such a course of action would be immeasurably risky and outright unwise. While this may be unlikely, just as we do not fully put our fears to rest on the basis that Putin is a rational actor, Putin can no more put his own fears of American irrationality out of mind. The United States maintains such a capability and the correct combination of misperceptions and coincidences could make such a gamble appear the only option. 

7. Introducing nukes means losing control. 

As Clausewitz tells us, war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult. Innumerable sources of friction affect everything. As one might expect, launching a nuclear strike is not exempt from this. To choose to use a nuclear weapon would mean assuming a fundamentally unknowable risk. There is no shortage of accidents in war, to introduce nuclear weapons means to introduce the question of nuclear accidents. 

More specifically, the proverbial sword of Damocles that hangs above any potential nuclear use is inadvertent escalation. While a tactical nuclear weapon is intended to only affect a specific target, any number of accidents in the employment of the weapon could result in failure to limit the scope of nuclear use. The most commonly discussed example is of the possibility of fallout drifting into NATO countries, but the unprecedented nature of nuclear use means that its consequences simply can’t be anticipated. To use a nuclear weapon would therefore mean to lose any semblance of control over the situation. Anything, from the transit of the device, to its delivery, to its targeting, to its firing could go fractionally wrong and threaten nuclear annihilation. 

8. Nukes are scary for everyone. 

That means everyone. Including Putin. No one knows what will happen if Putin orders the use of tactical nuclear weapons, only that everything, including nuclear war, is possible. That alone makes it extremely unlikely they will be used. Given the nature of many of the outcomes, that uncertainty means Putin would have to bet his life to use one.

Even if none of these scenarios are particularly likely, let alone nuclear armageddon, each represents a clear path to the ruin of the Putin regime. That means nuclear use increases the danger to Putin personally. Most importantly, nuclear use constitutes a greater risk than a defeat in Ukraine. If Putin is forced to bet his life on a course of action, there’s no reason on Earth to imagine that he believes that the consequences of nuclear use are safer than the consequences of losing in Ukraine. The unfortunate fact that even a total Ukrainian victory is unlikely to result in Putin’s downfall, provides the more encouraging fact that Putin still has far too much to lose to seriously consider nuclear use. 

To reiterate: we have every reason to believe that Putin will accept a defeat in Ukraine before he would use a nuclear weapon. Defeat in Ukraine would mean predictable domestic threats, for which Putin has developed a sophisticated defense. To use even a small warhead would be a leap in the dark. The more devastating a potential outcome is, the less likely it has to be to deter someone. Even a small chance of escalation to nuclear war is an overwhelming reason to avoid setting down the path. Putin is nowhere near desperate enough to seriously consider taking that bet.