Does Russia Have Escalation Dominance?
Why NATO sets its own pace for engagement in Ukraine
When we use the phrase, “escalation dominance,” it refers to a situation in which one party in a conflict is able to gain an advantage by escalating to a level that its opponent is either unwilling or unable to match or exceed. In this case, the party possessing escalation dominance is able to gain an advantage over its rival, as in a confrontation, the rival will avoid escalation because of the imbalance against it. Escalation dominance is therefore highly valued for its ability to dissuade rival powers from intervening in the first place, thereby avoiding crises altogether.
Some have argued that Russia’s willingness to engage in a conventional war in Ukraine while the West has been limited in its interventions indicates that Russia possesses escalation dominance by way of its greater commitment. In other words, that Russia has been able to escalate to the extent it desires without the West daring to match its efforts due to the escalation dominance Russia possesses.
Against this view, I will argue that NATO in fact possesses escalation dominance due to overwhelming conventional balance of force in its favor. As a result of this, Russia finds itself in a difficult situation; NATO can deliver as many weapons as it pleases to Ukraine without Russia being able to retaliate. Escalation does not have to be intentional. In fact, it is as much a byproduct of other actions as it is itself a means. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example, caused escalation. A war on the borders of a nuclear alliance raised the chance of an accident that could lead to nuclear war. In this case, rather than a strategy, escalation is a price to be paid for certain actions; Russia had to accept the increased risk of nuclear war in order to invade Ukraine.
Escalation is often analogized to a ladder. When two states are in confrontation, either state may choose to move up a rung of the ladder and force its opponent either to match it or concede the point. This ladder runs the entire spectrum, from mere rhetoric to nuclear war. States may move quickly up the ladder but, apt to the metaphor, key rungs cannot be skipped. While nuclear weapons are rarely directly involved in confrontations, escalation is nevertheless intrinsically tied to nuclear weapons and the potential for their use. Conventional balance of forces is an important factor in the resolution of crises between nuclear powers, but the terror of nuclear war is central.
A fundamental concept of nuclear theory is that of the manipulation of risk. Introduced by famed game theorist Thomas Schelling in his seminal work on nuclear strategy, Arms and Influence, this strategy is one that acknowledges that it is impossible to win a nuclear war and that therefore no one would ever start one intentionally. The key word being “intentionally.” The prospect of unintentional escalation is what gives manipulation of risk its viability. While Mutually Assured Destruction means that one cannot threaten to deliberately start a nuclear war, one can instead create a situation in which there is a heightened risk of nuclear war unless the issue at question is resolved.
Escalation, therefore, means raising the prospect of an accidental nuclear exchange. For example, a full scale conventional war is highly escalatory because the general chaos and heightened nuclear readiness entailed means nuclear annihilation is only one mistake away. Conventional war therefore must not be understood as inherently leading to nuclear war, but only increasing the risk. This risk is sufficiently daunting to dissuade nuclear powers from daring conventional wars. Nuclear war is so disastrous that finding an agreement is far preferable.
Nevertheless, the terms of that agreement are determined by the willingness of either side to endure risk, a quality demonstrated through escalation. A state assumes risk by escalating in order to place the other state in the position of acting second. If your opponent escalates, you have the choice between accepting the risk of nuclear conflict or accepting their terms to avoid it. Both sides place themselves in a situation that deliberately courts disaster as a gamble that the other side will sooner find it unbearable and offer more favorable terms.
As we can see, one state cannot deter another by directly promising nuclear annihilation. Threatening mutual suicide is non-credible, and therefore ineffective. Yet, a state can achieve deterrence by threatening conventional war, with the high risk of nuclear use that it entails. The threat is not the use of nuclear weapons, but of placing both states in a position in which they might not be able to prevent their use. NATO, therefore, exercises deterrent power without a stated policy of nuclear first-use. To invade the Baltics, for example, Russia would have to be willing to assume an incredibly high level of risk of nuclear war as would be inherent in a conventional confrontation with the American military.
This use of the threat of conventional war, however, is only effective so long as there is a rough parity in the conventional balance of force between the two parties. If the balance of force starkly favors one side, the threat of conventional war diminishes in deterrent value. This can be seen historically in the deep concerns both NATO and the Warsaw Pact held and the great expense endured maintaining conventional parity. If nuclear weapons were a true guarantor of peace between their owners, there would hardly have been a reason to maintain large-scale conventional forces (indeed, at various points in time, the American Air Force made this exact argument as to the redundancy of the other services). By contrast, imbalances in conventional force were viewed as unacceptable.
The reason this was the case can be seen clearly with a simple role-playing exercise. If you were the American President during the Cold War and received news that the Soviets had seized West Berlin, killing or capturing the American garrison, how would you respond? Would you order the commencement of a nuclear war, knowing the annihilation it would entail? Any reasonable person would balk at the prospect. More likely, you might consider this an act of war and begin conventional operations against Soviet formations in Europe. Of course, this is only a realistic course of action if the conventional balance is good enough not to make this a hopeless prospect.
From this, we can see that conventional weakness incentivizes your opponent to boldly seize contested objectives, presenting a fait accompli. Mutually Assured Destruction means a nuclear response is off the table, and with bad odds, and conventional war isn’t a desirable prospect. These factors are known to the opponent which lets them feel free to take aggressive action without fear of reprisal.
To reverse the scenario, let’s say you’re a Soviet decision-maker and have been posed the question as to what prevents you from seizing West Berlin. If the Americans rely entirely on a nuclear deterrent, the answer to that question is “precious little.” Even if the Americans say they will use nuclear weapons, that kind of threat can’t be taken seriously in an environment where mutual destruction is assured. No one’s going to end the world over West Berlin. But if there’s a serious conventional force, they could fight for it. In that case, there’d be protracted war between nuclear superpowers and a risk every day of nuclear weapons being used either through misunderstanding, miscommunication, or misperception.
This all returns us to the principle of manipulation of risk. In an environment of mutually assured destruction, no one interested in their own survival would ever make the conscious decision to start a nuclear war. The utility of nuclear arsenals then is in their potential to be used inadvertently. The fear that deters conflict between nuclear powers is not that a Commander in Chief might decide he and his country were tired of living and on that basis give the order to use nuclear weapons, fully aware of the consequences. Rather, deterrence rests on the idea that the fog of war and complex processes of command and control could go awry in such a manner that leads to nuclear use in spite of the efforts of higher echelons.
In the hypothetical situation where the US had neglected its conventional forces and the Soviets seized West Berlin, the US had to act second, and had no means to escalate. The bluff had been called, and they were left without a response, leaving the Soviets undeterred. In the second hypothetical, the US had the choice to escalate to conventional war, and throw the decision back upon the Soviets to then either endure the risks or come to the negotiating table. As demonstrated, from a position of conventional weakness, nuclear weapons have limited value. A state that is weak conventionally cannot make use of its nuclear arms because it cannot credibly threaten a conventional war. In other words, without relative conventional parity, a state is limited in its ability to escalate.
It is for this reason that Russia is at a severe disadvantage in escalation. Practically speaking, the entirety of Russian combat power is engaged in Ukraine. No capacity exists to threaten war with NATO and, as a consequence, several key rungs are missing from the Russian escalation ladder. The prospect of a nuclear exchange with Russia is hard to imagine without a conventional conflict preceding it. Given that the current balance of force radically favors NATO, it is unimaginable that Russia would enter a war it stood no chance of winning. As a result, Russia cannot credibly threaten a broader conflict with NATO, and therefore is unable to threaten escalation to deter NATO from arms deliveries or other forms of intervention.
Why then, if NATO possesses escalation dominance, does it not intervene directly and decisively against Russia in Ukraine? The answer to this is that the simple factors of the costliness of war and nuclear risk are present even when one side has escalation dominance. NATO could intervene, but it has judged Ukraine not worth the costs and the risk involved. In areas that NATO is more strongly invested in, such as the security of bloc members, the bloc would be willing to exercise its capacity for escalation dominance.
As a result, the degree to which NATO invests in Ukrainian victory is determined not by any fear of Russian retaliation, but by its members’ own willingness to endure costs and risks for this purpose. The limitations in the forms and quantities of aid provided to Ukraine by the West must therefore be judged not as the product of Russian coercion, but a direct reflection of the strategic value placed on Ukraine’s speedy success. The extent of Western engagement in Ukraine therefore should not be understood as set by Russian escalation, but rather by the extent to which the West is willing to escalate and bear the risks of accidental nuclear use, no matter how small they may be. Even the infinitesimal chance of nuclear war is sufficient to deter the West from greater support of Ukraine because of the limited strategic investment in Ukrainian success.