You are absolutely right, he didn't. I met John Boyd at Air University in the early 1990s to discuss Airpower Doctrine with him and others. It was apparent early on that he was a "true believer" and knew in his fighter pilot's heart that airpower could singlehandedly win a war if only they were allowed to get inside the opponent's OODA Loop. Anything contrary to that conviction was quite simply wrong.
My impression of Boyd (which I'll address in a later part) is that he was a Schlieffen-type, a peacetime thinker concerned with finding the "secret" to victory, based on what the intellect of the commander could inflict on the hapless foe.
Clausewitz, by contrast, had a fairly miserable time fighting against Napoleon and disclaims any particular route to victory, saying instead it must always rely on the commander to grasp the circumstances and find an appropriate route. His statement that experience shows it takes extraordinary effort to achieve even average results makes sense for someone who commanded at Wavre, rather than in wargames.
My assessment of Boyd may well change as I read more on him, but his service record is in no way incompatible with the comparison to Schlieffen (who also had active service). Combat experience is clearly no great defense against false ideas—some of those subject to Clausewitz's harshest critiques served with distinction in the Seven Years' War. I do agree with Clausewitz that most writing done on war, even by bloodied soldiers, has been bad. It does not follow that every experienced soldier would walk away in disgust upon hearing them.
What I mean regarding Clausewitz's experience is that being on the opposite side of Napoleon (and indeed his marshals), having his country conquered and occupied, gave him a markedly different perspective on the conduct of war. Both Schlieffen and Boyd were scions of victorious armies, and raised in countries of great means. I speculate that this contributes to what I see as excessive optimism in both their concepts of war. This, in contrast, to Clausewitz, who devotes much more time to the matter of avoiding disaster when outmatched, and is consequently much more circumspect about the margins of victory that can be reliably achieved (without great losses).
I will leave judgment of his contributions to design and engineering to those more acquainted with that area.
I'm speculating on the psychological development of the theorists (Clausewitz, Schlieffen, Boyd), not the security demands of the situation. Boyd was a fighter pilot in Korea, where the air force at least had inarguable success. At roughly the same age, Clausewitz was a PoW and saw his country occupied and humiliated. It is not groundless to suggest that formative years in the US military during WW2 and Korea have a profoundly different psychological effect than spending that time in service of a pondering and ultimately disgraced middle-power like Prussia in Clausewitz's youth.
I'm well-aware of the Americans "Reformers" and the quandary posed by Vietnam. I'm suggesting that the approach Boyd took to this problem was informed by his earlier experiences. I think it also ought to be clear why the defeat in Vietnam (a war in which the US had immense superiority in strength) would cause a very different psychological impression than the kind of utter defeat Prussia suffered in 1806.
To pose it a different way, Boyd's service did not involve having to confront being greatly materially and intellectually outmatched. My hypothesis (yet to be contradicting by anything I have read in "A New Conception of War) is that this is responsible for some of the defects I see in his thinking (his overstatement of what can be inflicted on the enemy).
You are absolutely right, he didn't. I met John Boyd at Air University in the early 1990s to discuss Airpower Doctrine with him and others. It was apparent early on that he was a "true believer" and knew in his fighter pilot's heart that airpower could singlehandedly win a war if only they were allowed to get inside the opponent's OODA Loop. Anything contrary to that conviction was quite simply wrong.
My impression of Boyd (which I'll address in a later part) is that he was a Schlieffen-type, a peacetime thinker concerned with finding the "secret" to victory, based on what the intellect of the commander could inflict on the hapless foe.
Clausewitz, by contrast, had a fairly miserable time fighting against Napoleon and disclaims any particular route to victory, saying instead it must always rely on the commander to grasp the circumstances and find an appropriate route. His statement that experience shows it takes extraordinary effort to achieve even average results makes sense for someone who commanded at Wavre, rather than in wargames.
My assessment of Boyd may well change as I read more on him, but his service record is in no way incompatible with the comparison to Schlieffen (who also had active service). Combat experience is clearly no great defense against false ideas—some of those subject to Clausewitz's harshest critiques served with distinction in the Seven Years' War. I do agree with Clausewitz that most writing done on war, even by bloodied soldiers, has been bad. It does not follow that every experienced soldier would walk away in disgust upon hearing them.
What I mean regarding Clausewitz's experience is that being on the opposite side of Napoleon (and indeed his marshals), having his country conquered and occupied, gave him a markedly different perspective on the conduct of war. Both Schlieffen and Boyd were scions of victorious armies, and raised in countries of great means. I speculate that this contributes to what I see as excessive optimism in both their concepts of war. This, in contrast, to Clausewitz, who devotes much more time to the matter of avoiding disaster when outmatched, and is consequently much more circumspect about the margins of victory that can be reliably achieved (without great losses).
I will leave judgment of his contributions to design and engineering to those more acquainted with that area.
I'm speculating on the psychological development of the theorists (Clausewitz, Schlieffen, Boyd), not the security demands of the situation. Boyd was a fighter pilot in Korea, where the air force at least had inarguable success. At roughly the same age, Clausewitz was a PoW and saw his country occupied and humiliated. It is not groundless to suggest that formative years in the US military during WW2 and Korea have a profoundly different psychological effect than spending that time in service of a pondering and ultimately disgraced middle-power like Prussia in Clausewitz's youth.
I'm well-aware of the Americans "Reformers" and the quandary posed by Vietnam. I'm suggesting that the approach Boyd took to this problem was informed by his earlier experiences. I think it also ought to be clear why the defeat in Vietnam (a war in which the US had immense superiority in strength) would cause a very different psychological impression than the kind of utter defeat Prussia suffered in 1806.
To pose it a different way, Boyd's service did not involve having to confront being greatly materially and intellectually outmatched. My hypothesis (yet to be contradicting by anything I have read in "A New Conception of War) is that this is responsible for some of the defects I see in his thinking (his overstatement of what can be inflicted on the enemy).
I think that is a good summary of his drive.