Realism and Reality — The Limitations of Theory

"Realists" have fallen into the same trap as French Generals before WWI

Realists have made the news again for typically inglorious reasons after signing an open letter that calls for NATO not to admit Ukraine. Rather than look directly at the claims made in the open letter, as I believe my original critique of Realist policy prescriptions for Ukraine is still applicable, in this post I’ll take aim at what I believe is a foundational error in Realist theory. 

To begin, I’ll provide a brief introduction on Realism: Realism is a school of thought in the field of international relations that argues the dominating factor is pursuit of power by states in an anarchic system. Realists argue that the nature of the international system means that states have no choice but to try to increase their own power. There’s no world government to appeal to, so states have to rely on their own strength for security. 

The zero-sum anarchy of the world order means that states must prioritize power over all-else. So, Realists argue, the disposition of power in the international system is the prime-mover. Consequently, Realists consider it unnecessary to examine the particulars of a state to predict its actions, reducing internal politics to a “black box.” 

There’s a number of objections one could make to the assumptions and conclusions of Realism, but for my particular criticism, we’ll begin by returning to Clausewitz’s On War. 

“War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will”

From the start, Clausewitz uses the dialectical method to propose a thesis: war is nothing more than a duel on a grand scale. From this, one would expect violence to increase to the greatest extent possible as each was obliged to match his opponent’s efforts. He then provides an antithesis: war as a mere extension of policy. This would predict wars to be grounded purely in national interest and fully constrained by the directives of statesmen. To reconcile the two points of view, Clausewitz developed the synthesis position of war as the product of a peculiar trinity of chance, passion, and reason. The philosophical concept, “pure,” “absolute,” or “perfect” war was modified by the fact it did not occur in a vacuum so that it took on the characteristics of “real” war, as it existed in both direct experience and the historical record. 

“If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war.”

However, many readers took Clausewitz at his word when he described war’s most absolute, “perfect” form. In so doing, what was written to describe one dimension of war became a maxim. The description of war in the philosophical absolute was interpreted as a prescription for how future wars might be won. This misinterpretation was responsible for the “cult of the offensive” in the First World War which led to predictably disastrous results. 

As with adherents to the cult of the offensive, Realists mistake the absolute in philosophical terms with the final word in practical terms. While it may seem facile to point out that war and international relations both happen in the real world and not the abstract realm of philosophy, it is a vital distinction. Examining either from the “absolute” perspective is akin to assuming an action takes place on a frictionless plane in physics: useful for deriving principles, but unsuitable for predicting or explaining specific cases. 

“The French army, having returned to its traditions, no longer admits any other law in the conduct of operations than the offensive.”

-French Military Doctrine 1913: The Decrees of October 28 and December 2

The pursuit of power is the core of international relations only in the same way that the duel is the core of war. With no intervening factors, this is true. But this is a purely philosophical concept, not a theory of behavior. At most, it is a thesis without an antithesis, and so produces no synthesis. In reality, both war and the pursuit of state power are subject to the general forces of politics. What is most efficient from a “purely military” or “power maximizing” perspective is only one factor that influences the ultimate political decision. Realists fail to recognize that while pursuit of power is the nature of international competition, its form will be modified by other forces. International competition takes place in the political arena. Like war, it is a form of policy and so subject to the same logic. 

The mistake of Realists and of doctrine writers preceding WWI is in failing to understand the point of investigating the core of phenomena. It was useful for Clausewitz to define absolute war—something that exists only in the realm of philosophy—because it makes it easier to identify the forces that modify it to produce war in the real world. Realists fail to use power politics as a means to better understand the panoply of forces that drive state action. Rather, the concept is used as an ultima ratio, a final argument and so falls short. 

Bismarck once said, “Politics is the art of the possible—the attainable—the art of the next best.” This pithy statement reflects the universal reality that political leaders cannot do all they would like, even if it would be within state capacity. Even true autocrats cannot entirely dispense with compromise. A course of action may be extraordinarily strategically beneficial to a state, yet it may be unable to follow it due to the constraints of domestic policy. 

For example, a state might benefit from an opportunistic attack against a rival but be forced to forgo it due to lack of popular support for mobilization. A Realist analysis would be incapable of explaining why a state would forgo such an opportunity. Without looking at domestic politics, the constraints that drove the decision would be ignored. Likewise, history shows many states choosing to begin a war of their own choosing without any clear strategic need, accepting enormous risk and cost without a proportional benefit. Realism either declares these exceptions (without seeking to explain when and why exceptions occur) or superimposes a strategic rationale. Realism’s assumptions about the state are not supported by evidence.

It is only by recognizing the fact that foreign policy is a product of domestic policy that we can explain the numerous cases of a state weakening itself on the international stage due to internal strife. If the need to gain power at the expense of other states was truly the straitjacket Realists purport it to be, civil wars would be an almost unheard of occurrence. 

This allows us to posit an antithesis to the Realist view, that the actions of states are a product of domestic political interests, with domestic advantage overriding reason of state. This is, of course, overstating the case. Our synthesis, from this dialectic, would be that domestic politics determines the extent to which a state can pursue power. Domestic politics may be either a damper or an accelerant for a state’s propensity to seek power. A state may range from incapacitated on the international stage due to internal politicking (see the Liberum Veto in Poland-Lithuania) or be ruinously aggressive due to ideology of conquest beyond its means. 

Realism, then, may be used to examine how the international system exerts pressure on a state to behave in a certain way. The international system drives states to acquire power to ensure their security. If we ask what a state might do to maximize its power, we may determine the likelihood of that course of action based on the domestic politics of the state in question. 

The utility of Realism is therefore limited. To apply it predictively, one must have a strong understanding of the constellation of domestic politics in the state being analyzed. When one possesses that understanding, the insight gained in looking into the system's strategic pressures to maximize power is limited. As we have established, these pressures are not overriding, as Realists claim, but subject to what is possible politically. Certainly, developments in foreign affairs may shift the political landscape to change what is possible, but this is far from invariable. It must be said, ultimately, that domestic politics tends to have a stronger effect on the behavior of states than the distribution of power in the international system. As such, Realism, as a comprehensive theory, is incapable of explaining or predicting the behavior of states. 

This still leaves many questions unanswered. After all, to criticize is much easier than to construct. Is it possible to develop a comprehensive theory of international relations? Is Realism still useful lens, even if with major caveats? As Clausewitz writes, “Man and his affairs. however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best.”