I have also been worried about an over-correction with many writers recently citing the “short war myth.” However, when discussing that myth, writers do not recognize that it is generally believed by the country initiating a war. An aggressor risks war out of the belief that victory can be had at a reasonable cost. Rolling the iron dice sometimes does payoff as with Bismarck’s Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of France, the Six-Day War, the Persian Gulf, the Russo-Georgian War, Crimea, and Nagorno-Karabakh. To deter an aggressor from believing that a war could be short, the defender needs to display readiness to prevail in a short war. In Taiwan and the Baltic, we need to display a capability to prevent a rapid fait accompli to deter Russian or Chinese dreams of a short war.
Australia and Japan do have the capacity to prevent a fait accompli as you put it, but the most important demonstrable element is willingness to put boots on the ground.
In the absence of an easily resupplied overland border Taiwan is not Ukraine where not so plausible NATO deniability can be maintained with disavowed ‘volunteer’ advisors and contractors.
Hi Kiran to predict how a government will fight a war you have understand why it is fighting. From the Chinese point of view Taiwan is part of China and the fact that it is not ruled by the central government is result of the civil war which hasn't been completely resolved yet.
Think of the American civil war. If Brittain had decided to back Independance of the Confederate States Lincoln wouldn't have just thrown up his hands and said, "fair cop gov you won". Lincoln and the vast majority of the US government saw preserving the territorial integrity of the Union as incredibly important and were prepared to do just about anything to win.
For Xi and the government of China is the same. They see maintaining the territorial integrity of as incredibly important and they will do anything they can to prevent Taiwanese independence.
Whether a war over Taiwan lasts 1 week or 1 decade it will always end up in the US throwing in the towel because it is far more important for China than it is for the US.
National will is an important element, but it’s ultimately only one factor in determining capabilities. China maintains that Taiwan is a part of it, but has not been able to effect this. That they feel this way about Taiwan has not stopped them from de facto tolerating their independence for decades.
The value of Taiwan is clearly not infinite, nor is their victory inevitable, else they would have fought and won long ago.
A strategy of exhausting American political will would be difficult to implement due to geography. If the Americans are winning, they’ll be able to prevent China from being able to actually invade Taiwan. Whether the war goes on for one year or ten, there’s no reason the Americans would suddenly decide to give China what it could not take.
The inherent difficulty in amphibious landings means a long war would also allow Taiwan to make itself virtually impregnable.
The assumption that the PRC would invade as opposed to blockade over months to prevail—and then only if gravely provoked by some independence vote or other major change to the cross straits status quo such as turning the island into a TLAM launch pad—is a questionable one. Even the Taiwan film Zero Day Attack posits a weeks-long blockade and economic siege plus effort to stir up internal unrest and political collapse before a single PLA soldier invades.
There are other questionable assumptions of the above article—for example that US East Coast shipbuilding or the Panama Canal choke point would remain untouched in an open shooting war with China—are also suspect. Blowback from waging the mother of all proxy wars on Russia in Ukraine in the form of the Russian Pacific Fleet subs and more likely naval drones launched from Russian subs stalking carrier groups acting as force multipliers for the PLAN never gets mentioned for …reasons.
I have also been worried about an over-correction with many writers recently citing the “short war myth.” However, when discussing that myth, writers do not recognize that it is generally believed by the country initiating a war. An aggressor risks war out of the belief that victory can be had at a reasonable cost. Rolling the iron dice sometimes does payoff as with Bismarck’s Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of France, the Six-Day War, the Persian Gulf, the Russo-Georgian War, Crimea, and Nagorno-Karabakh. To deter an aggressor from believing that a war could be short, the defender needs to display readiness to prevail in a short war. In Taiwan and the Baltic, we need to display a capability to prevent a rapid fait accompli to deter Russian or Chinese dreams of a short war.
I discuss this more and the problems we have analyzing the character of war here: https://www.ausa.org/publications/a-problem-of-character
Australia and Japan do have the capacity to prevent a fait accompli as you put it, but the most important demonstrable element is willingness to put boots on the ground.
In the absence of an easily resupplied overland border Taiwan is not Ukraine where not so plausible NATO deniability can be maintained with disavowed ‘volunteer’ advisors and contractors.
Nuke Taiwan to show China we mean business
Hi Kiran to predict how a government will fight a war you have understand why it is fighting. From the Chinese point of view Taiwan is part of China and the fact that it is not ruled by the central government is result of the civil war which hasn't been completely resolved yet.
Think of the American civil war. If Brittain had decided to back Independance of the Confederate States Lincoln wouldn't have just thrown up his hands and said, "fair cop gov you won". Lincoln and the vast majority of the US government saw preserving the territorial integrity of the Union as incredibly important and were prepared to do just about anything to win.
For Xi and the government of China is the same. They see maintaining the territorial integrity of as incredibly important and they will do anything they can to prevent Taiwanese independence.
Whether a war over Taiwan lasts 1 week or 1 decade it will always end up in the US throwing in the towel because it is far more important for China than it is for the US.
National will is an important element, but it’s ultimately only one factor in determining capabilities. China maintains that Taiwan is a part of it, but has not been able to effect this. That they feel this way about Taiwan has not stopped them from de facto tolerating their independence for decades.
The value of Taiwan is clearly not infinite, nor is their victory inevitable, else they would have fought and won long ago.
A strategy of exhausting American political will would be difficult to implement due to geography. If the Americans are winning, they’ll be able to prevent China from being able to actually invade Taiwan. Whether the war goes on for one year or ten, there’s no reason the Americans would suddenly decide to give China what it could not take.
The inherent difficulty in amphibious landings means a long war would also allow Taiwan to make itself virtually impregnable.
The assumption that the PRC would invade as opposed to blockade over months to prevail—and then only if gravely provoked by some independence vote or other major change to the cross straits status quo such as turning the island into a TLAM launch pad—is a questionable one. Even the Taiwan film Zero Day Attack posits a weeks-long blockade and economic siege plus effort to stir up internal unrest and political collapse before a single PLA soldier invades.
There are other questionable assumptions of the above article—for example that US East Coast shipbuilding or the Panama Canal choke point would remain untouched in an open shooting war with China—are also suspect. Blowback from waging the mother of all proxy wars on Russia in Ukraine in the form of the Russian Pacific Fleet subs and more likely naval drones launched from Russian subs stalking carrier groups acting as force multipliers for the PLAN never gets mentioned for …reasons.