I wonder what additional strength a full mobilization could unlock.
Drafting more men gives diminishing returns if they have to be armed with increasingly old weapons. The Russian system seems challenged to sufficiently train the professional army, let alone many draftees. Switching to war economy only makes sense if the freed civilian resources can be applied in a useful way for military production or logistics. While this was the case during WW2, I find this not obvious now. Mobilizing civilian logistics capacities and switching the civilian industry to produce simple arms or other gear (tents, clothes, fortification materials) is possible and useful, but I am not convinced that civilian resources can be used to increase high tech arms production significantly. Not because of a principal impossibility, but because Russian advanced technology industry is so weak outside of the arms and nuclear sector. In other words, almost everyone and everything that could in theory be used to produce advanced weapons already did so prior to the war in Russia (very different from say China or Germany, which have a strong advanced technology sector outside of military needs).
Great points, particularly regarding the limited applicability of civilian industry towards advanced munitions production. While I believe mobilization would offer the Russians their best chance at some kind of victory, I do not believe that chance is particularly high, at least partially due to the industrial problem.
The main advantage of a full mobilization would be in terms of morale. Having a clear propaganda line would provide Russian forces with a much stronger sense of purpose for the war, which is particularly important in the case of conscripts. A secondary advantage would be in terms of production of the essentials of war. Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and artillery pieces would all be essential to ensuring the Russian army is able to sustain defensive attritional warfare.
Good point re morale. Mobilization could perhaps create a feeling of "ownership" of the war, while until around a month ago, it has only been waged as a TV spectacle from the POV of most Russians.
Another thing I suppose mobilization could do is to increase the pressure on the military to improve conditions and accountability.
Before partial mobilization, serving in the army (ground forces) likely was a task for the fringe of society: The poor, ethnic minorities, the uneducated. This made it easy to sweep problems under the rug. Now increasingly people are drafted who may have an uncle in a leadership position who knows how to annoy the bureaucracy.
Looking forward to further blog posts. I am only an interested layman, but On War is one of my favorite books, and also useful for matters outside of war. For example, I found his way of thinking in terms of opposing or parallel forces in a societal context applicable in many other circumstances too. It is a somewhat physical or numerical way of looking at social problems and behavior of groups.
Mobilization also allows for more manpower, which Russia seriously lacks. One of the main reason behind the success of the Kharkiv counteroffensive is that the Russian forces there simply isn't enough
True-I believe that the overall combat value of the Russian army in Ukraine will grow through the mobilization, the question is by how much.
The Western material support is somewhat stagnating, there haven't been delivered new capabilities in quite some time, only quantity has been raised. I think that we won't see further sweeping Ukrainian offensives in the next months, since Russian unit density will be too high, but no significant Russian advances either. To break the (increasingly defensively postured) Russian lines quickly, Ukraine will need significantly more artillery, Western MBTs and IFVs and ATACMS for deep strikes against Russian artillery logistics, neither of which the West has delivered so far. So I am afraid it will come down on slow attrition, where Western backed Ukraine will hopefully come out on top due to better loss ratios and weak Russian economy. We shall see.
I wonder what additional strength a full mobilization could unlock.
Drafting more men gives diminishing returns if they have to be armed with increasingly old weapons. The Russian system seems challenged to sufficiently train the professional army, let alone many draftees. Switching to war economy only makes sense if the freed civilian resources can be applied in a useful way for military production or logistics. While this was the case during WW2, I find this not obvious now. Mobilizing civilian logistics capacities and switching the civilian industry to produce simple arms or other gear (tents, clothes, fortification materials) is possible and useful, but I am not convinced that civilian resources can be used to increase high tech arms production significantly. Not because of a principal impossibility, but because Russian advanced technology industry is so weak outside of the arms and nuclear sector. In other words, almost everyone and everything that could in theory be used to produce advanced weapons already did so prior to the war in Russia (very different from say China or Germany, which have a strong advanced technology sector outside of military needs).
Great points, particularly regarding the limited applicability of civilian industry towards advanced munitions production. While I believe mobilization would offer the Russians their best chance at some kind of victory, I do not believe that chance is particularly high, at least partially due to the industrial problem.
The main advantage of a full mobilization would be in terms of morale. Having a clear propaganda line would provide Russian forces with a much stronger sense of purpose for the war, which is particularly important in the case of conscripts. A secondary advantage would be in terms of production of the essentials of war. Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and artillery pieces would all be essential to ensuring the Russian army is able to sustain defensive attritional warfare.
Good point re morale. Mobilization could perhaps create a feeling of "ownership" of the war, while until around a month ago, it has only been waged as a TV spectacle from the POV of most Russians.
Another thing I suppose mobilization could do is to increase the pressure on the military to improve conditions and accountability.
Before partial mobilization, serving in the army (ground forces) likely was a task for the fringe of society: The poor, ethnic minorities, the uneducated. This made it easy to sweep problems under the rug. Now increasingly people are drafted who may have an uncle in a leadership position who knows how to annoy the bureaucracy.
Looking forward to further blog posts. I am only an interested layman, but On War is one of my favorite books, and also useful for matters outside of war. For example, I found his way of thinking in terms of opposing or parallel forces in a societal context applicable in many other circumstances too. It is a somewhat physical or numerical way of looking at social problems and behavior of groups.
Mobilization also allows for more manpower, which Russia seriously lacks. One of the main reason behind the success of the Kharkiv counteroffensive is that the Russian forces there simply isn't enough
True-I believe that the overall combat value of the Russian army in Ukraine will grow through the mobilization, the question is by how much.
The Western material support is somewhat stagnating, there haven't been delivered new capabilities in quite some time, only quantity has been raised. I think that we won't see further sweeping Ukrainian offensives in the next months, since Russian unit density will be too high, but no significant Russian advances either. To break the (increasingly defensively postured) Russian lines quickly, Ukraine will need significantly more artillery, Western MBTs and IFVs and ATACMS for deep strikes against Russian artillery logistics, neither of which the West has delivered so far. So I am afraid it will come down on slow attrition, where Western backed Ukraine will hopefully come out on top due to better loss ratios and weak Russian economy. We shall see.