If you buy into John Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism, then all Great Powers are power-maximisers and therefore revisionist. Because all Great Powers possess some offensive military capability, Mearsheimer concludes - directly contradicting Defensive Realist Kenneth Waltz - there are no status quo powers. All Great Powers have revisionist aims with the supreme goal of hegemony.
Because Iran does not yet possess nuclear weapons, its revisionist hegemonic strategy is conflict via proxy, which it has executed very successfully. Greater Iran now spans from Lashkar Gar and Gwadar in the East to Tyre in the West, and has Finlandised the Gulf.
Post-Soviet Russia was for years a crippled Great Power (much like Weimar Germany), but its actions in 2014 were a claiming of its stake in Ukraine against the EU Great Power (that is, Bundesrepublik Germany) using the words of NATO-hatred.
As for Appeasement, the British Empire was not ready even for a defensive war with its new radar not working properly till early 1939, and the first squadron of Spitfires becoming operational just a fortnight before Munich. The Royal Navy - the Empire's offensive military capability - was ready, though, and scored victories from the start, so Chamberlain was Britain's Realpolitiker.
"For example, Russia and Iran, avowed opponents of the American system, cannot be said to be revisionist powers for the simple reason that they are too weak to even consider fighting a great power war against the United States and its allies"
States can be locally revisionist even if they are too weak to be globally revisionist. I believe that the focus on global great powers is not useful here. A state's capability and will for power projection also quickly reduces with distance, though the distance penalty to power projection becomes less steep with improving transport and communication. Therefore, a medium power may locally be stronger than a global hegemon.
Being disruptive globally helps countries being revisionist locally.
I agree that both of types fit the definition of revisionist locally. The distinction I draw is that true "revisionist" states are revisionist locally with the direct aim of increasing their power to revise the international order as a whole and are willing to risk a great power war accomplish this. In contrast, interdictionist powers are unwilling to risk great power war and are focused more on regime stability.
Understood, makes sense. So you are talking about the combination of intent and capability.
I have no doubt that the Iranian leadership would like to change the global world order, but unlike e.g. Germany in the first half of the 20th century, it doesn't have a realistic chance and therefore settles for smaller goals.
This is a good point, Walter. When in history has there ever been a Global Power that could project dominant power anywhere in the world? Britain had an Empire on which the sun never set, but it was loath to set foot on the European continent, and there were huge swathes of the world on which it never trod. Then came the USA but again it only had dominance in the region of the Monroe Doctrine. It is easy to see how PRC could become a genuinely global power, but again there are places where it is utterly absent: have you noticed there are no mainland Chinese on LinkedIn?
I think only the US in 1945 fit the narrow definition of a global hegemon that could project power everywhere successfully if it really wanted to.
Power projection really quickly diminishes with distance to the homeland and the proliferation of nuclear weapons has created some hard constraints on it
Yes, power projection can diminish with distance, but more than distance is water, and more than water is having or not having the military capability to project power.
If a hegemon made an alliance with a regional power, that would overcome the distance barrier through bases and pre-positioning. I think the USA has 700 bases across 70 countries. PRC is increasing its overseas bases from a very low start, but is building the New Silk Road which will give it unprecedented logistics for power projection.
Continental powers like Russia and PRC can threaten their neighbours, but lack large and sophisticated navies. PRC is currently building the world's largest navy, so we know where that is taking the new Chinese Empire, in contrast with the EU / Bundesrepublik Deutschland, which is investing in becoming the largest and most advanced Army and Airforce in the European landmass, but with no naval power projection capability. So, while distance and water will severely limit the EU's power projection, neither will limit China and Emperor Xi.
If you buy into John Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism, then all Great Powers are power-maximisers and therefore revisionist. Because all Great Powers possess some offensive military capability, Mearsheimer concludes - directly contradicting Defensive Realist Kenneth Waltz - there are no status quo powers. All Great Powers have revisionist aims with the supreme goal of hegemony.
Because Iran does not yet possess nuclear weapons, its revisionist hegemonic strategy is conflict via proxy, which it has executed very successfully. Greater Iran now spans from Lashkar Gar and Gwadar in the East to Tyre in the West, and has Finlandised the Gulf.
Post-Soviet Russia was for years a crippled Great Power (much like Weimar Germany), but its actions in 2014 were a claiming of its stake in Ukraine against the EU Great Power (that is, Bundesrepublik Germany) using the words of NATO-hatred.
As for Appeasement, the British Empire was not ready even for a defensive war with its new radar not working properly till early 1939, and the first squadron of Spitfires becoming operational just a fortnight before Munich. The Royal Navy - the Empire's offensive military capability - was ready, though, and scored victories from the start, so Chamberlain was Britain's Realpolitiker.
"For example, Russia and Iran, avowed opponents of the American system, cannot be said to be revisionist powers for the simple reason that they are too weak to even consider fighting a great power war against the United States and its allies"
States can be locally revisionist even if they are too weak to be globally revisionist. I believe that the focus on global great powers is not useful here. A state's capability and will for power projection also quickly reduces with distance, though the distance penalty to power projection becomes less steep with improving transport and communication. Therefore, a medium power may locally be stronger than a global hegemon.
Being disruptive globally helps countries being revisionist locally.
I agree that both of types fit the definition of revisionist locally. The distinction I draw is that true "revisionist" states are revisionist locally with the direct aim of increasing their power to revise the international order as a whole and are willing to risk a great power war accomplish this. In contrast, interdictionist powers are unwilling to risk great power war and are focused more on regime stability.
Understood, makes sense. So you are talking about the combination of intent and capability.
I have no doubt that the Iranian leadership would like to change the global world order, but unlike e.g. Germany in the first half of the 20th century, it doesn't have a realistic chance and therefore settles for smaller goals.
This is a good point, Walter. When in history has there ever been a Global Power that could project dominant power anywhere in the world? Britain had an Empire on which the sun never set, but it was loath to set foot on the European continent, and there were huge swathes of the world on which it never trod. Then came the USA but again it only had dominance in the region of the Monroe Doctrine. It is easy to see how PRC could become a genuinely global power, but again there are places where it is utterly absent: have you noticed there are no mainland Chinese on LinkedIn?
I think only the US in 1945 fit the narrow definition of a global hegemon that could project power everywhere successfully if it really wanted to.
Power projection really quickly diminishes with distance to the homeland and the proliferation of nuclear weapons has created some hard constraints on it
Yes, power projection can diminish with distance, but more than distance is water, and more than water is having or not having the military capability to project power.
If a hegemon made an alliance with a regional power, that would overcome the distance barrier through bases and pre-positioning. I think the USA has 700 bases across 70 countries. PRC is increasing its overseas bases from a very low start, but is building the New Silk Road which will give it unprecedented logistics for power projection.
Continental powers like Russia and PRC can threaten their neighbours, but lack large and sophisticated navies. PRC is currently building the world's largest navy, so we know where that is taking the new Chinese Empire, in contrast with the EU / Bundesrepublik Deutschland, which is investing in becoming the largest and most advanced Army and Airforce in the European landmass, but with no naval power projection capability. So, while distance and water will severely limit the EU's power projection, neither will limit China and Emperor Xi.