Several random thoughts this morning as I finish the morning pot of coffee after casting my early ballot yesterday morning. Beginning with the thought that we are seeing an upscale model (thanks to modern technology) of the balance of power/great game played by Britain in the 1800s (with a glance towards Mackinder). NATO and the EU were intended in part to constrain the member states within generally acceptable patterns of policy and behavior- though I sometimes worry that these communities are too tolerant of some of the excesses found in some member states. Sun Tzu and other thinkers in China and India go on at great length and without the added geographical attachments about how smaller to larger states can interact to achieve their goals. As for China, I’m a bit more worried today about managing its decline (as well as Xi’s decline) as its economy shows the strains of past demographic policies, corruption, and the burden of geopolitical and economic decisions made to benefit Xi rather than China. Excellent discussions here, btw.
It is buck-passing because the Soviets were attempting to leave the burden of containing Germany on the Western Allies. The gambit for the Soviets was to take the gains in Eastern Europe from the Pact and hope the Nazis and Allies would maul one another. In the meantime, the Red Army could reorganize and attempt to establish deterrence.
Would the realist view suggest to arm Ukraine enough for swift victory or just enough so they aren't losing but, if at all, only slowly winning?
The latter seems to be the current approach of Ukraine's supporters, though unwillingness to do the necessary high one-time spending for swift victory may be the more important reason than strategic deliberations.
Do you have an idea why Mearsheimer is so opposed to Western support for Ukraine?
"Realism argues that however moral the individuals involved in determining foreign policy will be, the anarchic and zero-sum nature of the system and the high stakes involved."
Comma behind "that"? Found it hard to understand sentence without
"causing the Germans to more vulnerable targets. "
That's a very good question. I think a case can be made for either on Realist grounds for either a swift victory or prolonged conflict as both serve the purpose of weakening the Russians. I think on the balance, a swift victory for Ukraine has the edge because it is more durable (there's no chance things turn in favor of the Russians as might happen in a prolonged conflict) and that it leaves Ukraine stronger than a prolonged war might. Because Ukraine is not a great power, it gaining power at the expense of Russia is preferable to both countries losing power because it ensures Ukraine is a greater threat for Russia.
I don't want to speculate too much on Mearsheimer's mens rea, but his general strategic argument is that the only relevant international competition is between the US and China, and therefore trying to contain Russia or defend Eastern Europe is a waste of time. In my opinion, this ignores that while Russia is far off superpower status, it can nevertheless impose serious costs on the US similar to Iran. As well, Mearsheimer's brand of Realism doesn't accept any differences in "kinds" of states. So, there is no distinction between revisionist and status quo powers. As such, Mearsheimer believes Russia can be appeased in Europe and made a partner for competition against China.
Of course, attempting this would undermine American credibility, and is reliant on the unsupportable assumption that there is anything the US could offer Russia that would turn it into a reliable partner.
I agree with your reasoning that while the main competition is with China, Russia is interest aligned with China while challenging the US'&allies' position, so should be weakened from this POV. In a scenario where China has successfully eclipsed the US&allies, interest alignment might flip if China's expansionism and century-of-humiliation revanchism turns against Russia too.
Mearsheimer's "mens rea" is stated in Tragedy: GPs create Spheres of Influence in which they have hegemony, and work hard to ensure that no other GP gets a look-in. Yes, JJM is currently concerned with the rising power of PRC, but in Ukraine it is more that GP Russia sees the West foolishly and at times knavishly challenging it in what it perceives to be its SoI. Read Putin's paper that (much of) Ukraine is in, and also that it is not a real country.
While Mearsheimer's history of 2013-4 is factually suspect (NATO was not expanding, it was the EU that was), nevertheless Putin's Russia did not want any Power, whether the EU or NATO, contending with it in what it considered its own backyard.
"Realists such as ... Mearsheimer have argued that the West is to blame for the war in Ukraine on the grounds that it violated Russia’s sphere of influence, making war inevitable. However, this argument is untenable on Realist grounds, as assigning blame is beyond the scope of Realism".
No, a significant difference between Waltz and JJM is the latter also has a Theory of Foreign Policy, and policy, of course, is "two things and two things only: making you afraid of it and telling you who's to blame for it".
Certainly anyone over 50 will want to put the shaft to the ancient enemy. Younger than that need some history lessons.
Several random thoughts this morning as I finish the morning pot of coffee after casting my early ballot yesterday morning. Beginning with the thought that we are seeing an upscale model (thanks to modern technology) of the balance of power/great game played by Britain in the 1800s (with a glance towards Mackinder). NATO and the EU were intended in part to constrain the member states within generally acceptable patterns of policy and behavior- though I sometimes worry that these communities are too tolerant of some of the excesses found in some member states. Sun Tzu and other thinkers in China and India go on at great length and without the added geographical attachments about how smaller to larger states can interact to achieve their goals. As for China, I’m a bit more worried today about managing its decline (as well as Xi’s decline) as its economy shows the strains of past demographic policies, corruption, and the burden of geopolitical and economic decisions made to benefit Xi rather than China. Excellent discussions here, btw.
I don't understand how the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is bandwagoning rather than buck-passing. Seems like it exemplified close cooperation
It is buck-passing because the Soviets were attempting to leave the burden of containing Germany on the Western Allies. The gambit for the Soviets was to take the gains in Eastern Europe from the Pact and hope the Nazis and Allies would maul one another. In the meantime, the Red Army could reorganize and attempt to establish deterrence.
Would the realist view suggest to arm Ukraine enough for swift victory or just enough so they aren't losing but, if at all, only slowly winning?
The latter seems to be the current approach of Ukraine's supporters, though unwillingness to do the necessary high one-time spending for swift victory may be the more important reason than strategic deliberations.
Do you have an idea why Mearsheimer is so opposed to Western support for Ukraine?
"Realism argues that however moral the individuals involved in determining foreign policy will be, the anarchic and zero-sum nature of the system and the high stakes involved."
Comma behind "that"? Found it hard to understand sentence without
"causing the Germans to more vulnerable targets. "
Insert "chose"?
That's a very good question. I think a case can be made for either on Realist grounds for either a swift victory or prolonged conflict as both serve the purpose of weakening the Russians. I think on the balance, a swift victory for Ukraine has the edge because it is more durable (there's no chance things turn in favor of the Russians as might happen in a prolonged conflict) and that it leaves Ukraine stronger than a prolonged war might. Because Ukraine is not a great power, it gaining power at the expense of Russia is preferable to both countries losing power because it ensures Ukraine is a greater threat for Russia.
I don't want to speculate too much on Mearsheimer's mens rea, but his general strategic argument is that the only relevant international competition is between the US and China, and therefore trying to contain Russia or defend Eastern Europe is a waste of time. In my opinion, this ignores that while Russia is far off superpower status, it can nevertheless impose serious costs on the US similar to Iran. As well, Mearsheimer's brand of Realism doesn't accept any differences in "kinds" of states. So, there is no distinction between revisionist and status quo powers. As such, Mearsheimer believes Russia can be appeased in Europe and made a partner for competition against China.
Of course, attempting this would undermine American credibility, and is reliant on the unsupportable assumption that there is anything the US could offer Russia that would turn it into a reliable partner.
Thanks for the detailed reply!
I agree with your reasoning that while the main competition is with China, Russia is interest aligned with China while challenging the US'&allies' position, so should be weakened from this POV. In a scenario where China has successfully eclipsed the US&allies, interest alignment might flip if China's expansionism and century-of-humiliation revanchism turns against Russia too.
Mearsheimer's "mens rea" is stated in Tragedy: GPs create Spheres of Influence in which they have hegemony, and work hard to ensure that no other GP gets a look-in. Yes, JJM is currently concerned with the rising power of PRC, but in Ukraine it is more that GP Russia sees the West foolishly and at times knavishly challenging it in what it perceives to be its SoI. Read Putin's paper that (much of) Ukraine is in, and also that it is not a real country.
While Mearsheimer's history of 2013-4 is factually suspect (NATO was not expanding, it was the EU that was), nevertheless Putin's Russia did not want any Power, whether the EU or NATO, contending with it in what it considered its own backyard.
"Realists such as ... Mearsheimer have argued that the West is to blame for the war in Ukraine on the grounds that it violated Russia’s sphere of influence, making war inevitable. However, this argument is untenable on Realist grounds, as assigning blame is beyond the scope of Realism".
No, a significant difference between Waltz and JJM is the latter also has a Theory of Foreign Policy, and policy, of course, is "two things and two things only: making you afraid of it and telling you who's to blame for it".