This section “The Cult of the Offensive and Wargaming “.
I may see something there that my mind put there, so I may or may not see what you did there- but the vices therein could quite apply not to the military but civilian leadership of my lifetime (the military leadership of my time from Powell to Milley) has been rather warning and reluctant, the Civilian Leadership has met few cults it didn’t embrace. After initial success and victory has been our inevitable destruction .
This is fascinating, within two comments we have two complete oposing oppinion of the same person Wihl 2. I rembember discussing in school how much Bethman Holweg was to blame. Reading here he might as well tried to improve the time tables of the Berlin bus company.
Bethmann was not being entirely deceptive when he said after the war that he viewed himself "only as the Kaiser's political advisor."
In terms of Wilhelm's character, John C. Roehl's "Kaiser Wilhelm II and German Anti-Semitism" is fairly damning. While Frederick III attended synagogue in the garb of a Prussian field marshal to demonstrate solidarity with Berlin's Jews, Wilhelm II praised the man calling for "a fight [against Jews] until complete victory and we will not rest until they have been thrown down... into the dust where they belong" as the "second Luther."
When the same man (Stoecker) was facing dismissal as court chaplain due to libel charges, Wilhelm decisively interceded in his favor, appealing to his grandfather, "O dear Grosspapa, it is disgusting to observe how in our Christian-German, good Prussian land the Judenthum, twisting and corrupting everything, has the cheek to attack such men and in the most shameless, insolent way to seek their downfall."
He was more of a tragic than a terrible person. He was actually quite witty, and there is ample proof that his intelligence was above average. His major flaws were his impulsiveness, his inability to restrain himself with his public comments on all and everything (although Twitter was yet to be invented) often very spontaneous and without considering the consequences of his often imprudent remarks which made him often sound terribly aggressive and outright brutal. However, there is no proof that he personally ever was involved in any brutality or barbarity. There were though clear signs of presumtuousness and arrogance, most probably the result of the poor choice of his ultranationalistic teachers, who spoilt the young prince and failed to develop the many talents and gifts that he had in him. Another explanation for his sometimes big mouthed pompousness was his desire to compensate for his deformed left arm, crippled as a result of complications during his birth. The young boy was later treated for years with methods which we would today call torture to force him into using his left arm, and that obviously caused more than an injury and left psychological scars, for which he overcompensated.
As Kaiser, the first serious error of judgement was the spontaneous dismissal of the founder of the Reich, chancellor Bismarck, whose clever security architecture successfully succeeded in avoiding Germany ever becoming isolated among Europe’s major powers. He misjudged the challenges of keeping the peace in Europe and allowed Bismarcks successors to ultimately dismantle Bismarck’s policy of a carefully maintained balance of powers. This decision was probably more than anything else the result of a typical intergenerational conflict. It was tragic never the less, much pain might have been avoided, if Bismarck would have been given the chance to organize his own succession and retirement from active politics.
But other than that one should remember that Kaiser Wilhelm II was never really fully in charge. Already under his father Friedrich III and grandfather Wilhelm I the country was effectively ruled by Bismarck and the military in the background had an enormous influence on political decision making. Germany also was maybe lacking the democratic traditions of the Anglosphere, but had a very active parliament where deputies were relentless in claiming their say in budget matters and other national issues. But especially in the years leading up to and definitely during the World War the Kaiser was increasingly reduced to being an influential figurehead, nothing more. The ultimate decisions were taken by the chief of staff who consulted with Kaiser and the civilian government only when the generals saw a need for that. Field Marshall Hindenburg and his deputy General Erich Ludendorff ruled Germany during the war as they saw fit, the Kaiser only heard of important decisions after they had been executed. On the other hand the Allied War propaganda required a personal target to motivate the population for the necessary sacrifices for the war effort and the loud mouthed Kaiser suited this pupose well. That is probably the main reason for the horrible reputation of the Kaiser until today.
Wilhelm II, had he not lost his father so soon and would have had time to be better prepared for the job, had he had more qualified teachers and better advisors, he might have become a decent constitutional monarch, popular at home and respected internationally. But fate never afforded him this chance and it was not all his fault.
Wilhelm was without a doubt a bad man, in a way typical of reactionaries of his time. His antisemitism is insufficiently discussed. While his father attended synagogues in solidarity, Wilhelm praised an antisemite as a “new Luther.”
Of course, the harm he did was fully out of proportion to his character, but more a product of incompetence. Wilhelm did not desire a great European war, but lacked the clarity to direct German policy in a consistent (let alone wise) manner.
In terms of barbarity, Wilhelm was notably callous towards prisoners of war, especially Russians, whom he once suggested by systematically starved. Likewise, his speech saying the Chinese ought to be given no quarter ran against the laws of war and common decency that Bülow vainly attempted to suppress the printing of that section. The Kaiser had a vicious streak to match his grandiosity.
He centralized authority upon himself and proved manifestly incapable of assuming the responsibility he felt was his right. His flaws would not have been nearly as consequential if he had the humility to allow better men to act on Germany’s behalf.
His control over personnel decisions gave him a lot of power.
Wilhelm II squandered an excellent position. He may not have been evil as a person, but losing the clearly winning hand that Germany was requires a lot of bad decision making and incompetence.
The Emperor was the link between the civilian and military government, especially if the military did not voluntarily cooperate and coordinate with the civilian leadership. He failed in this role.
That the German government, Kaiser and Diplomatic Services were unaware that the offensive in the West was going through Belgium is vitiated by the Diplomatic histories of July 1914 alone. That’s the major reason given in England for going to war, and a major theme of the frenetic diplomacy of July 1914.
Recent research has disproven this, in Mombauer "Moltke," 160:
"As Jagow informed the Reichsarchiv, he had known about the General Staff's strategic intentions even before his appointment in 1913: 'The General Staff's deployment plan was generally known to me long before my appointment as Secretary of State in the Auswaertiges Amt.' In May 1920, Bethmann-Hollweg informed the Reichsarchiv that he, too, had known about the General Staff's 'deployment plan for a war on two fronts long before the war."
This shouldn't be overly surprising as the Entente was aware of the possibility as well. By 1906, the British were conducting joint planning with the French under the assumption that the Germans would do precisely this. (Ritter 47)
The issue of WW1 German war guilt is assumed in this article as ground truth, and that that it mainly rests on the German military desiring war- ?
This ignores what France, Russia were doing, Russia’s vendetta against Austria, Frances desire for revanche, that Lord Grey of England was arranging alliance with France by 1907 without the knowledge of PM Conrad Bannerman and to the surprise of the new Head of the Admiralty Winston Churchill in 1912, and the shock of the English Parliament in July 1914, all of which came out after the war. Above all it ignores the situation in the Balkans, which was hardly the fault of the Germans. There was a war in the Balkans in 1912 of course, this did have great influence on what happened in 1914.
The points about the German fleet are correct, it was folly, and folly to think England would allow Germany to have the Belgian Estuaries; this may be the greatest incompetence of all.
All the European powers were culpable in 1914, all had piled arsenals for decades, worse they schemed and intrigued against each other as if they were Borgias. No innocents. None.
Austria is of course most directly responsible for the outbreak of war, however it is indisputable that Austria only declared war because of German assurances. Ritter (Sword and Scepter vol2, pg 237) makes clear that the Austrian foreign minister, so often fearful of war, was surprised and emboldened by German calls for prompt action rather than restraint, and so agreed with Conrad.
Ritter, in his conclusion to the second volume, writes:
"We are no longer content to comprehend the outbreak of the First World War simply in terms of inexorable fate, the necessary and natural result of tensions, power politics, and conflicts of national interest in an age of imperialism. Despite the powerful forces that hold mankind under their spell and in their thrall, there always remains—such is our firm belief—a sphere for freedom of decision on the part of responsible statesmen acting with political reason."
This, coming from Ritter, who vehemently rejected the Fischer thesis, and attributes the war more to blindness on the part of German leadership than any desire, is particularly meaningful.
However, more recent research has shown a clearer picture in which political leaders like Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser—while willing to risk war—were unable to resist pressure from martial figures who actively desired a settling of accounts, even if it meant world war. As Annika Mombauer writes: "In the last days of July, when first the Kaiser and later Bethmann got 'cold feet', the military began to dominate decision-making as they pushed for mobilization as soon as possible, fearing that yet another change of heart might jeopardize their plans at the last minute."
This section “The Cult of the Offensive and Wargaming “.
I may see something there that my mind put there, so I may or may not see what you did there- but the vices therein could quite apply not to the military but civilian leadership of my lifetime (the military leadership of my time from Powell to Milley) has been rather warning and reluctant, the Civilian Leadership has met few cults it didn’t embrace. After initial success and victory has been our inevitable destruction .
Thank you
This is fascinating, within two comments we have two complete oposing oppinion of the same person Wihl 2. I rembember discussing in school how much Bethman Holweg was to blame. Reading here he might as well tried to improve the time tables of the Berlin bus company.
Bethmann was not being entirely deceptive when he said after the war that he viewed himself "only as the Kaiser's political advisor."
In terms of Wilhelm's character, John C. Roehl's "Kaiser Wilhelm II and German Anti-Semitism" is fairly damning. While Frederick III attended synagogue in the garb of a Prussian field marshal to demonstrate solidarity with Berlin's Jews, Wilhelm II praised the man calling for "a fight [against Jews] until complete victory and we will not rest until they have been thrown down... into the dust where they belong" as the "second Luther."
When the same man (Stoecker) was facing dismissal as court chaplain due to libel charges, Wilhelm decisively interceded in his favor, appealing to his grandfather, "O dear Grosspapa, it is disgusting to observe how in our Christian-German, good Prussian land the Judenthum, twisting and corrupting everything, has the cheek to attack such men and in the most shameless, insolent way to seek their downfall."
Not exactly a friendly character.
He was more of a tragic than a terrible person. He was actually quite witty, and there is ample proof that his intelligence was above average. His major flaws were his impulsiveness, his inability to restrain himself with his public comments on all and everything (although Twitter was yet to be invented) often very spontaneous and without considering the consequences of his often imprudent remarks which made him often sound terribly aggressive and outright brutal. However, there is no proof that he personally ever was involved in any brutality or barbarity. There were though clear signs of presumtuousness and arrogance, most probably the result of the poor choice of his ultranationalistic teachers, who spoilt the young prince and failed to develop the many talents and gifts that he had in him. Another explanation for his sometimes big mouthed pompousness was his desire to compensate for his deformed left arm, crippled as a result of complications during his birth. The young boy was later treated for years with methods which we would today call torture to force him into using his left arm, and that obviously caused more than an injury and left psychological scars, for which he overcompensated.
As Kaiser, the first serious error of judgement was the spontaneous dismissal of the founder of the Reich, chancellor Bismarck, whose clever security architecture successfully succeeded in avoiding Germany ever becoming isolated among Europe’s major powers. He misjudged the challenges of keeping the peace in Europe and allowed Bismarcks successors to ultimately dismantle Bismarck’s policy of a carefully maintained balance of powers. This decision was probably more than anything else the result of a typical intergenerational conflict. It was tragic never the less, much pain might have been avoided, if Bismarck would have been given the chance to organize his own succession and retirement from active politics.
But other than that one should remember that Kaiser Wilhelm II was never really fully in charge. Already under his father Friedrich III and grandfather Wilhelm I the country was effectively ruled by Bismarck and the military in the background had an enormous influence on political decision making. Germany also was maybe lacking the democratic traditions of the Anglosphere, but had a very active parliament where deputies were relentless in claiming their say in budget matters and other national issues. But especially in the years leading up to and definitely during the World War the Kaiser was increasingly reduced to being an influential figurehead, nothing more. The ultimate decisions were taken by the chief of staff who consulted with Kaiser and the civilian government only when the generals saw a need for that. Field Marshall Hindenburg and his deputy General Erich Ludendorff ruled Germany during the war as they saw fit, the Kaiser only heard of important decisions after they had been executed. On the other hand the Allied War propaganda required a personal target to motivate the population for the necessary sacrifices for the war effort and the loud mouthed Kaiser suited this pupose well. That is probably the main reason for the horrible reputation of the Kaiser until today.
Wilhelm II, had he not lost his father so soon and would have had time to be better prepared for the job, had he had more qualified teachers and better advisors, he might have become a decent constitutional monarch, popular at home and respected internationally. But fate never afforded him this chance and it was not all his fault.
Wilhelm was without a doubt a bad man, in a way typical of reactionaries of his time. His antisemitism is insufficiently discussed. While his father attended synagogues in solidarity, Wilhelm praised an antisemite as a “new Luther.”
Of course, the harm he did was fully out of proportion to his character, but more a product of incompetence. Wilhelm did not desire a great European war, but lacked the clarity to direct German policy in a consistent (let alone wise) manner.
In terms of barbarity, Wilhelm was notably callous towards prisoners of war, especially Russians, whom he once suggested by systematically starved. Likewise, his speech saying the Chinese ought to be given no quarter ran against the laws of war and common decency that Bülow vainly attempted to suppress the printing of that section. The Kaiser had a vicious streak to match his grandiosity.
He centralized authority upon himself and proved manifestly incapable of assuming the responsibility he felt was his right. His flaws would not have been nearly as consequential if he had the humility to allow better men to act on Germany’s behalf.
His control over personnel decisions gave him a lot of power.
Wilhelm II squandered an excellent position. He may not have been evil as a person, but losing the clearly winning hand that Germany was requires a lot of bad decision making and incompetence.
The Emperor was the link between the civilian and military government, especially if the military did not voluntarily cooperate and coordinate with the civilian leadership. He failed in this role.
That the German government, Kaiser and Diplomatic Services were unaware that the offensive in the West was going through Belgium is vitiated by the Diplomatic histories of July 1914 alone. That’s the major reason given in England for going to war, and a major theme of the frenetic diplomacy of July 1914.
Recent research has disproven this, in Mombauer "Moltke," 160:
"As Jagow informed the Reichsarchiv, he had known about the General Staff's strategic intentions even before his appointment in 1913: 'The General Staff's deployment plan was generally known to me long before my appointment as Secretary of State in the Auswaertiges Amt.' In May 1920, Bethmann-Hollweg informed the Reichsarchiv that he, too, had known about the General Staff's 'deployment plan for a war on two fronts long before the war."
This shouldn't be overly surprising as the Entente was aware of the possibility as well. By 1906, the British were conducting joint planning with the French under the assumption that the Germans would do precisely this. (Ritter 47)
The issue of WW1 German war guilt is assumed in this article as ground truth, and that that it mainly rests on the German military desiring war- ?
This ignores what France, Russia were doing, Russia’s vendetta against Austria, Frances desire for revanche, that Lord Grey of England was arranging alliance with France by 1907 without the knowledge of PM Conrad Bannerman and to the surprise of the new Head of the Admiralty Winston Churchill in 1912, and the shock of the English Parliament in July 1914, all of which came out after the war. Above all it ignores the situation in the Balkans, which was hardly the fault of the Germans. There was a war in the Balkans in 1912 of course, this did have great influence on what happened in 1914.
The points about the German fleet are correct, it was folly, and folly to think England would allow Germany to have the Belgian Estuaries; this may be the greatest incompetence of all.
All the European powers were culpable in 1914, all had piled arsenals for decades, worse they schemed and intrigued against each other as if they were Borgias. No innocents. None.
Austria is of course most directly responsible for the outbreak of war, however it is indisputable that Austria only declared war because of German assurances. Ritter (Sword and Scepter vol2, pg 237) makes clear that the Austrian foreign minister, so often fearful of war, was surprised and emboldened by German calls for prompt action rather than restraint, and so agreed with Conrad.
Ritter, in his conclusion to the second volume, writes:
"We are no longer content to comprehend the outbreak of the First World War simply in terms of inexorable fate, the necessary and natural result of tensions, power politics, and conflicts of national interest in an age of imperialism. Despite the powerful forces that hold mankind under their spell and in their thrall, there always remains—such is our firm belief—a sphere for freedom of decision on the part of responsible statesmen acting with political reason."
This, coming from Ritter, who vehemently rejected the Fischer thesis, and attributes the war more to blindness on the part of German leadership than any desire, is particularly meaningful.
However, more recent research has shown a clearer picture in which political leaders like Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser—while willing to risk war—were unable to resist pressure from martial figures who actively desired a settling of accounts, even if it meant world war. As Annika Mombauer writes: "In the last days of July, when first the Kaiser and later Bethmann got 'cold feet', the military began to dominate decision-making as they pushed for mobilization as soon as possible, fearing that yet another change of heart might jeopardize their plans at the last minute."